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CoopErAtion AnD intEgrAtion: 
rECommEnDAtionS for trAnSAtlAntiC 
EnErgy SECUrity
 Andrei Stetsenko
While American dependence on energy imports has been extensively analyzed and critiqued, the United States has done relatively little to help address its Eu-
ropean allies’ reliance on imported energy.  The European Union 
(EU) is the “world’s largest importer of oil and gas,” buying eighty-
two percent of its oil and fifty-seven percent of its natural gas from 
abroad.  Half of EU oil imports and a third of EU gas imports 
come from Russia (Cohen 2007, 2). This dependence, in conjunc-
tion with an EU energy market that remains divided along national 
borders and a pattern of bilateral deals between European national 
energy monopolies and external suppliers, endangers not only co-
operation within Europe but also the reliability and independence 
of European diplomatic and political action with regards to U.S. 
interests (Noël 2008, 8). Unable to form a common position based 
around a unified energy market, EU member states must increas-
ingly choose between stable energy supplies and siding with the 
United States on key diplomatic issues ranging from sanctions on 
Iran to reciprocal investment rights.
This paper aims to address this issue by analyzing the roots 
and effects of the disunity of European energy markets, noting the 
U.S. interest in an integrated, reformed European energy market, 
outlining policies that mitigate dependence on imported energy, 
providing two case studies which illustrate the drawbacks of current 
policy and potential of new proposals, and finally suggesting three 
major platforms of reform to be pursued jointly by the United States 
and the European Union. I argue that a European Union featuring 
a more competitive private energy market operating in the context 
of robust institutional oversight would enjoy significantly greater 
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commercial and diplomatic leverage – particularly with regards to 
supplier states such as Russia.  
BACKgroUnD informAtion
EU Energy Vulnerability
Recent European energy crises, including natural gas pric-
ing disputes between Russia and Ukraine in January 2006, March 
2008, and January 2009, have highlighted the vulnerability that 
results from Europe’s disunited market (Bely 2009, 3). Slow to 
respond to crises and its energy transmission infrastructure frag-
mented, the EU suffers from a “solidarity gap” between its new and 
old members (Tcherneva 2009, 1). For example, a dispute in June 
2007 between Germany and Poland, ostensibly about European 
parliamentary representation, was also an opportunity for Poland 
to express frustration at “the perceived reluctance of Berlin to stand 
up to Moscow on a whole host of issues,” including energy (Baran 
2007, 134).1   Russian energy firms, aware of this “lack of cohesion,” 
play their hand to further increase European dependence (Baran 
2007, 131). Russia’s gas export monopoly Gazprom does this by 
pursuing lucrative bilateral relationships directly with Western Eu-
ropean nations (Leonard and Popescu 2007, 16).
The world’s largest gas producer, Gazprom is the keystone of 
Russia’s energy industry (De Leon 2010, 1). Established in 1992 
from the foundation of the Soviet Ministry of Gas (Ahrend and 
Tompson 2005, 802), it produces 70 percent of Russian natural 
gas and represents virtually all of Russia’s gas exports (Roberts 
2004, 17). Of the 47 trillion cubic meters of gas reserves in Rus-
sia – roughly a quarter of estimated worldwide supply (Nicoll and 
Delaney 2007, 1)—Gazprom owns licenses to 60 percent (Inter-
national Energy Agency 2006, 15). Since 2005, 50.002 percent 
of Gazprom shares have been owned by the Russian state, giving 
the Kremlin majority control over the corporate board (Heinrich 
1 Certain Polish politicians argued representation should account for Polish population 
losses during World War II.
2006, 8).2   The remaining 49.998 percent of shares are owned 
by a combination of of Russian banks, energy firms, European en-
ergy distribution firms, and smaller private investors (OAO Gaz-
prom 2008, 80). Through downstream acquisitions, Gazprom has 
shifted policy from volume-maximization to profit-maximization, 
emphasizing added-value income over simple sales of gas at the 
border (Mitrova 2008, 2–3). Today, over seventy percent of Gaz-
prom’s profits are derived from sales of gas terminating in EU states 
(Cameron 2009, 26).
Gazprom’s bilateral contracts with major consumer countries 
such as Germany, France, Italy, and Austria were renewed in 2006 
for periods of between fifteen and twenty-five years (Stern 2007, 3). 
Both Gazprom and the European energy companies benefit from 
the “stable flow” of both revenue and energy supplies they provide 
in the context of an otherwise volatile price environment (Wu and 
Cavusgil 2006, 87). Both Gazprom and these European firms find 
the prospect of a reformed European energy market unappealing 
for many of the same reasons.  The Commission envisions a market 
that is integrated, transparent, and highly competitive.  Were the 
continent’s energy market ever to actually become liquid and amal-
gamated, both Gazprom’s and European monopolies’ profit spreads 
would inevitably decrease as competition eroded their ability to 
capture price differentials (Westphal 2006, 52; Checchi 2009, 1; 
Finon and Locatelli 2007, 29).3  
EU Energy markets and infrastructure
Collectively, the twenty-seven member states of the European 
Union form the world’s largest import market for natural gas, con-
suming 530 billion cubic meters (bcm) of gas in 2008 (Roberts 
2004, 2). However, the European Unioin’s large western members–
2 Specifically, the Federal Agency for State Property Management owns 38.373 percent, 
state oil company OAO Rosneft owns 10.740 percent, and state holding company OAO 
Rosgazifikatsiya owns 0.889 percent, for a subtotal of 50.002 percent.
3 Western Europe’s energy monopolies have countered that their large size enables them 
“to compete in” a highly competitive “global market place.”
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notably urFrance, Germany, and Italy–import large volumes of gas 
constituting relatively smaller proportions of their overall gas sup-
ply, in contrast to eastern members such as Poland and Bulgaria 
which import lower volumes constituting dramatically higher pro-
portions of their gas supply (Gelb 2007, 2–3). See Table 1 for a 
visualization of this distinction.
Table 1: Comparative Dependence on Russian Gas 
(Gelb 2007)
The “new” member states of Eastern Europe, which remain 
tethered to Soviet-era gas distribution systems, are almost three 
times more dependent on Russian gas than Western European na-
tions such as France, Germany, and Italy  (Noël 2008, 1–2; Euro-
pean Commission 2008, 9). Whereas Germany and Italy represent 
nearly half of total imports of Russian gas, countries including 
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Bulgaria, Slovakia, and Finland, while 
proportionally much smaller importers, individually draw nearly 
one-hundred percent of the gas they use from Russian supplies 
(Checchi, Behrens, and Egenhofer 2009, 19).4 These highly de-
pendent eastern members are truly the EU’s weak link in terms of 
energy security. They “lack modern, well-financed companies that 
can secure more favorable terms with Russia” and typically do not 
possess large storage facilities (Smith 2008, 18). In comparison, 
both France, Germany, and Italy all enjoy significant storage capac-
ity of “20 percent or more of annual consumption” (Westphal 2009, 
4 Similarly, Lithuania, Hungary, Slovakia, and Poland rely on Russia for nearly all their 
oil imports.
24). Figure 1 provides an additional illustration of the variation in 
European states’ dependence on Russian gas supplies.
Figure 1 : Disparities in Dependence
Source: Mitrova, Tatiana. “Gazprom’s Perspective on International Markets.” Russian 
Analytical Digest No. 41. Bremen: Research Centre for East European Studies, 20 May 
2008. 7.
The current European Commissioner for Energy, Guenther Oet-
tinger, confirmed this continental bifurcation as the decisive factor 
behind the Commission’s failure to implement the unbundling of 
energy monopolies, which would require the splitting of produc-
tion and distribution arms of current energy firms and an end to 
monopoly firms’ domination of national energy markets. Member 
states such as France and Germany, cognizant of the domestic sig-
nificance and economic weight of their national monopolies, have, 
according to Mr. Oettinger and others, consistently demurred on 
the topic of unbundling, leaving such proposals all but dead in the 
water (Pop 2010). This policy inaction is invaluable for Gazprom, 
as the Commission’s unbundling proposal would “effectively bar” 
the company from exercising any control over the wholesale and re-
tail distribution, or “downstream,” segment of the European energy 
market (Perovic 2008, 3).
Barring a dramatic change in its energy policy, the European 
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Union can expect to import eighty percent of its natural gas by 
2030 (European Commission 2006, 3). By then, the EU is project-
ed to consume between 700 (Roberts 2004, 2)and 816 bcm (Gok-
nel 2009) annuall of which only 163 bcm will be produced within 
the European Economic Area, principally in Norway (Internation-
al Energy Agency 2002, 189). Even in the extremely unlikely case 
that the EU’s gas demand does not grow over the next two decades, 
it will require significantly increased levels of imported gas to com-
pensate for declining internal production (Godzimirski 2009,4; 
Checchi, Behrens, and Egenhofer 2009, 14–15). 5 
Within Europe, the rift over how to react to this growing de-
pendence on external energy suppliers has been labeled “the most 
contentious issue for EU governments since Donald Rumsfeld and 
the Iraq War” (Leonard and Popescu 2007, 26). Nations such as 
Germany and Italy have concluded bilateral natural gas deals with 
Gazprom, for which such large, well-paying markets are essential 
to maintaining profitability (Cohen 2007, 1). Meanwhile, countries 
such as Slovakia and Poland (which import smaller amounts of gas) 
are less diversified in terms of energy supply and thus have suffered 
the brunt of recent gas shutoffs, including a two week standoff in 
January 2009 between Russia and Ukraine, Gazprom’s most im-
portant transit country for supplying EU customers.  During that 
crisis, leaders of large Western European EU members, including 
President Sarkozy, Chancellor Merkel, and Prime Minister Berlus-
coni, were noticeably silent (Tcherneva 2009, 1).
The infrastructural isolation of the newer EU member 
states—particularly Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia—further com-
plicates Europe’s physical and institutional energy disunity.  To an 
even greater extent than many other former members of the Soviet 
bloc, the Baltic states represent an “energy island” almost completely 
cut-off from gas markets in the rest of Europe (European Commis-
sion 2006, 6). The Commission’s proposed “solidarity rule,” intended 
to institutionalize the transfer of gas from less to more affected EU 
member states in the event of a crisis, would be of little use without 
5 Indigenous EU gas production, chiefly occurring in UK, Dutch, and Danish waters, is 
projected to plummet nearly 60 percent by 2030.
the necessary infrastructural connections to countries such as these 
(Le Coq 2009, 37; Finon and Locatelli 2007, 26–27).6  
While the EU has delineated in great detail a proposal for im-
proved inter-member state energy infrastructure called the Trans-
European Energy Networks (TEN-E) and has even outlined 
proposed mechanisms to compensate transmission operators for 
cross-border electricity transfers via Regulation 1228/2003/EC, a 
lack of necessary “financial and political instruments” has stood in 
the way of implementation (Westphal 2009,16). As a result, the 
Baltic states and Finland, which are not currently connected to the 
continental gas network, are unable to implement even nominal 
diversification away from Russian gas (Nyquist, Egenhofer, and 
Legge 2001, 20).
Background on the EU internal politics
Brussels is acutely aware of the price the European Union 
pays for its disunited energy market.   The European Commission, 
the major EU policymaking body, is conscious of the fact that a 
“common external dimension to its energy policy” is impossible 
without an integrated, collaborative market (Youngs 2007, 5). A 
large part of this problem pertains to a lack of institutional juris-
diction.  Energy is primarily the responsibility of the Commission, 
with its “energy technocrats” working together with national-level 
energy experts (Youngs 2007, 7). 7 Yet European member states 
are not empowered to apply Community (EU-wide) law (Council 
of the European Union 2003, 2); moreover, the European Commis-
sion has “no authority” to regulate the most visible manifestation of 
the current system: the long-term contracts between Gazprom and 
Europe’s national energy monopolies (Stern 2007, 2).  
6 One example of successful European infrastructural diversification occurred outside the 
scope of EU institutions.  In 2006, eight Central European nations, including EU members 
such as Austria but also non-members including Croatia, met following that year’s Russo-
Ukrainian gas crisis and were able to provide the collective political backing for a Hungary-
Croatia gas pipeline tying the region to a planned LNG deliquefaction terminal in Adria, 
Croatia.  
7 The Council of the European Union, meanwhile, takes a more political role.
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In the context of a liberalized Union-wide market in almost 
every economic sector, with the prominent exception of agriculture, 
energy policy remains a field viewed in Paris, Rome, and Berlin as a 
“national prerogative.” The old member states have been “extremely 
reluctant to cede any sovereignty to the EU in this sphere” (Man-
gott and Westphal 2008, 169). In particular, the western European 
energy monopolies (most notably France’s GDF Suez, Germany’s 
E.ON Ruhrgas, and Italy’s ENI) have largely stood in the way of 
establishing greater cross-border transmission interconnections. 
This situation exists because such interconnectors would have little 
value unless national utilities were able to sell energy across borders 
throughout the Common Market, which is a fundamental platform 
of proposals to “unbundle,” or split up, these very same national 
monopolies.
At the same time, the EU bureaucracy has produced no short-
age of memoranda, directives, and regulations discussing “effective 
legislative and regulatory frameworks” for reforming the EU’s en-
ergy sector (European Commission 2006, 3). The Commission’s 
Directive 98/30/EC, unanimously approved by EU member states 
in June 1998, as well as 2003/55/EC five years later, were intended 
to move Europe towards an integrated market (Lecarpentier 2005, 
1) by mandating “third party access to transmission and distribu-
tion networks” (Delegation of the European Union to Ukraine, 
Moldova, and Belarus  2009, 13–15). EU green papers, policy out-
lines, and regulatory briefs consistently emphasize the value of a 
more liberalized and more competitive European energy market, 
one diverse in terms of “source, supply, transport, and sales” (Cam-
eron 2009, 23). They note the challenge of accomplishing diversi-
fication in the context of projected rising overall demand and de-
clining indigenous production (Mangott and Westphal 2008, 175). 
Some even urge, obliquely, active diversification away from Russia: 
“increasing imports from an established source should be avoided” 
(Egenhofer et al. 2004, v).
Yet EU documents do not delineate any path towards imple-
mentation of mechanisms intended to counter third party supply 
monopolies.  As an example, Directive 2004/67/EC only requires 
that each member state establish “minimum security of supply 
standards” (Delegation of the European Union to Ukraine, Moldo-
va, and Belarus  2009, 15). Critics of current EU policy argue that 
handling of energy issues in Brussels has been “too rhetorical and 
too visionary,” devoting relatively little attention to pedestrian but 
crucial issues such as pipelines and market regulation (Hill 2005, 
6). Yet even EU diplomats acknowledge that member states are 
likely to maintain their own foreign policy approach, particularly 
with regards to energy.  Ursula Plassnik, a former Austrian foreign 
minister, noted that she expects member state priorities to prevail 
for some time even as the newly established European External 
Action Service draws upon staff from the Council Secretariat, the 
Commission, and member state foreign ministries to play a more 
active role in Europe’s external policy (Plassnik 2009).
Granted, Europe-wide energy policy has seen some limited 
success. For example, in 2003, the Commission forced Gazprom to 
drop “destination clauses” prohibiting downstream resale from its 
contracts with European firms (Lecarpentier 2005, 6). However, 
the EU bureaucracy has at times provided a sort of scapegoat for 
avoiding real liberalizing work in the energy sphere; in an interview, 
former President of the European Commission Romano Prodi 
noted member states’ tendency to play the “it was Brussels” card 
in order to defer responsibility for energy reform (Prodi 2009). 
Notably, the ultimately unratified European constitution would 
have explicitly established energy as an area of “shared competency” 
between member states and Brussels (Westphal 2006, 52). The 
Lisbon Treaty, which replaced the constitution, meanwhile, while 
continuing to formally refer to energy as an area of “shared compe-
tency,” specifically reserves decisions regarding “the general struc-
ture of [. . .] energy supply” for member states (Office for Official 
Publications of the European Communities 2007, C 306/88).
the U.S. interest in an integrated European Energy policy
Officials from Brussels to Bucharest, unable to form a com-
mon position based around a unified energy market, often must 
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“choose between an affordable and stable energy supply and siding 
with the US on some key issues” (Cohen 2007, 12). Aware of the 
possibility of a European “strategic drift” resulting from energy-re-
lated conflicts of interest exacerbated by the lack of a unified Euro-
pean energy policy or transmission network (Cohen 2007, 1) the 
United States can move proactively to ensure that Russian energy 
does not indirectly limit the economic and foreign policy indepen-
dence of the United States’ European partners. 
The United States can work to encourage the implementa-
tion of the policy options detailed below, particularly by influen-
tial EU members such as France, Germany, and Italy–the so-called 
“Strategic Partners” for whom special energy relationships with 
Russia have the potential to “[undermine] common EU policies” 
(Leonard and Popescu 2007, 2). Conspicuously silent on subjects 
ranging from Russian nuclear collaboration with Iran to the lack of 
investor rights for Western firms in Russia, these nations have the 
potential to stand as unencumbered partners to the United States 
and to each other.  
U.S. interest in a liberalized transatlantic Energy Structure
By simultaneously encouraging European integration on en-
ergy matters and cooperating with the European Union on the cre-
ation of a liberalized transatlantic framework for energy indepen-
dence, the United States can help enact a more sustainable energy 
policy for both itself and its allies.  Together, the European Union 
and the United States represent forty percent of world energy con-
sumption (Belkin 2008, CRS-18–CRS-26); as major consumers, 
Europe and the United States can jointly “promote more market-
based approaches to the development, extraction and trade of key 
energy commodities such as oil and gas” (Union of Industrial and 
Employers’ Confederations of Europe  2007, 4). In other words, 
work to liberalize a market in which suppliers currently tend to 
be monopolistic by creating a single, competitive buyers’ market 
to counter the sizeable leverage enjoyed by suppliers such as Gaz-
prom.  This transatlantic effort should focus first on integrating 
markets for natural gas.  For producer countries, oil is a much more 
difficult commodity to use for geopolitical purposes due to the fact 
that there exists a liquid international market for oil offering mul-
tiple, transparently priced supply, transport, and trans-shipment 
options (European Commission 2008, 4). This characteristic in 
and of itself is evidence of the benefits to be reaped from creating a 
comparably open market for natural gas (Noël 2008, 2). 
Limiting and counteracting the effects of energy import de-
pendency is critical to ensuring U.S. interests ranging from the 
security of the oil and gas supply to NATO bases in Turkey to 
preserving European diplomatic leverage vis-à-vis Russia (Cohen 
2007, 7). Such goals can be more effectively achieved through bet-
ter exchange of technology and information and through a coordi-
nated diplomatic effort to mitigate import dependency.  By pooling 
their diplomatic and economic influence, the United States and 
European Union can ensure that producer leverage is not exces-
sive and that the integrity of downstream distribution networks 
remains intact. 
other factors to Consider
While this cooperative approach is not intended to antago-
nize any third country, Russia will not react benignly to an overt 
attempt to reduce dependency on its energy.  Already, it has shown 
a willingness to disrupt any activity that mitigates this dependence, 
as evidenced by Russian efforts to suppress pipeline plans it does 
not control and embargo refineries that resist Gazprom acquisition. 
For example, Russia has succeeded in stifling the EU-supported 
Nabucco pipeline from Turkey to Austria in favor of its own plan, 
South Stream, achieved through intense lobbying of transit coun-
tries such as Hungary.  In Latvia and Lithuania, Russia ceased oil 
shipments to the Ventspils Nafta and Mazeikiu Nafta refineries, 
respectively, drawing a “muted” reaction from Western European 
EU members unwilling to protest at risk of revealing their own 
vulnerability (Baran 2007, 5). Through more vigilant enforcement 
of existing business regulations such as the aforementioned ener-
83Journal of Politics & Society82 Stetsenko  •  transatlantic Energy Security
gy directives outlined by the European Commission, the United 
States and the European Union can help ensure that monopolistic 
moves do not go uninvestigated and that a collective strategy is ad-
opted before it is too late.  Without such a strategy, the European 
Union—by far the largest, most lucrative, and most accessible con-
sumer of Russian energy—will continue to one-sidedly assume the 
vulnerabilities of an energy relationship characterized by mutual 
dependence (Bustin 2009).8
poliCy oBJECtiVES
An integrated Energy market
Europe can only leverage the scale of its energy market by 
uniting it.  By implementing the regulatory changes and develop-
ing the infrastructure necessary for this to happen, the European 
Union will give its eastern members the flexibility they currently 
lack due to their high individual levels of import dependency.  The 
contemporary European energy grid and market are a legacy of 
national utility operators and their 1970s-era bilateral agreements 
with the Soviet Ministry of Gas (European Commission 2003, 
1; Noël 2008, 8–9).9  Some names have changed—Italy’s Eni, 
the Netherlands’ Gasunie, Gaz de France, etc. now face Gazprom 
(Baran 2007, 8). However, these European companies continue to 
purchase gas using the same patchwork of bilateral deals that al-
low Russia to divide the continent into a series of weak segments 
(Korski 2008, 2). The alternative is a single European market that 
would require Russia to sell gas at the EU border, rather than to 
national firms.  In this type of new system, the opportunity cost 
8 Sixty-five percent of all Russian export revenues over the past few years have come 
from sales of energy to the European market. Russia is dependent on the openness of 
the European market; in fact, European profit margins finance profit-destructive energy 
subsidies to domestic Russian consumers.
9 Western and Central European countries began importing Soviet gas in the 1970s.  These 
imports received a significant boost as the Iranian Revolution largely removed Iranian gas 
from the continent’s potential supply mix and indigenous production in the North Sea 
began a steady decline.
of geopolitical uses of energy would be raised; instead of shutting 
supply off to one country, supplier states would only be able to de-
crease supply to the market as a whole—significantly disincentiv-
izing supply cuts (Noël 2008, 2).
By integrating their energy distribution and consumer net-
works, EU member states would confer on the energy sector the 
benefits accrued to virtually every other European industry through 
the Single Market: increased competition, lower prices for con-
sumers, and most importantly, dramatically increased bargaining 
strength vis-à-vis third countries.  A single European market for 
gas, and eventually for electricity as well, would leave Russia with 
one western export option: Europe (Noël 2008, 9), where a conces-
sion to any national distributor would immediately become avail-
able to consumers across Europe (Soros 2009, 2). The resentment 
and tension currently bred by eastern EU member states’ high de-
pendence on gas imports would be replaced with the solidarity and 
flexibility of an integrated grid.
By lobbying its allies, in particular Germany, France, and Ita-
ly—the governments most reluctant to liberalize gas distribution, 
largely due to their powerful national energy monopolies (Noël 
2008, 12)—the United States could help jumpstart the creation of 
a new European transmission and pipeline network in simultaneity 
with its own planned energy sector reforms (Obama for America 
2008, 8). Through the transatlantic technology and investment 
initiative recommended below, this effort would allow for easier 
substitution of energy sources, a critical step for integrating renew-
able technologies undergoing expansion in both Europe and the 
United States. The United States can benefit by working with the 
EU on establishing funding mechanisms for energy infrastructure 
modernization.  This coordination could take the form of a U.S. 
counterpart to the EU’s public infrastructure investor, the Europe-
an Investment Bank (EIB) (European Commission 2008, 8–12). 
In fact, the Obama administration has already voiced plans for a 
comparable U.S. institution designed to provide low-cost financing 
for electricity transmission and pipeline projects (Leftly 2009).
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Unbundled, liberalized Distribution
An integrated European market for energy would still not ful-
ly solve the issue of collusion between Gazprom and the so-called 
“national champions,” such as Germany’s E.ON Ruhrgas and Gaz 
de France.  Thus, a comprehensive energy solution would require 
that any firm engaged in the distribution of energy in Europe, be 
it Russian, Danish, or American, be split from energy production 
(Hanson 2008, 121). Such unbundling is already in place in the 
United States, where it has successfully increased competition in 
the energy sector (Pollitt 2007, 28). In Europe, this policy would 
forestall geopolitically motivated down-market moves.  In addition, 
it would complement an integrated energy grid by ensuring that 
gas and oil flow to distributors, not to the monopolies that cur-
rently segment the market along national borders. 
The relationship between these monopolies and Gazprom 
has directly contributed to the division between eastern and west-
ern EU members.10 For example, Polish politicians infamously 
referred to Nord Stream, an undersea pipeline currently under 
construction in a partnership between Gazprom and German firm 
E.ON Ruhrgas, as “a new Molotov-Ribbentrop pact” (Leonard and 
Popescu  2007, 10).11 The pipeline, laid along the Baltic seafloor, 
bypasses an overland route through Poland that would have cost 
an estimated one-third as much (Baran 2007, 135). The costs to 
Europe include higher energy prices for consumers and a free rein 
for Gazprom to foment friction and tension among EU member 
states (Cohen and Szaszdi 2009, 9). 
Energy sector unbundling would “Europeanize” the relation-
ship between Gazprom and the European Union (Noël 2008, 3). 
Gazprom realizes that downstream activity, including wholesale 
and retail distribution, holds the greatest long-term profit poten-
tial, especially if Europe succeeds in crafting a single energy market 
10 In an interview, Fyodor Lukyoanov, a prominent Russian journalist, referred to these 
national monopolies as “allies with Russia against liberalization.” Lukyanov, Fyodor. Editor-
in-Chief of Russia in Global Affairs. Videoconference Interview. 27 March 2009.
11 The 1939 agreement between Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union that included a 
secret protocol for the two sides’ partitioning of Poland.
(Locatelli 2008, 11). Yet Russia is aware that the only way to gain 
real access to these downstream assets is through reciprocation, 
that is, by allowing upstream access to European firms in exchange. 
For both Russia and the European Union, decoupling between pro-
duction and distribution would defuse security worries by ensur-
ing that no enterprise, domestic or foreign, controls the full vertical 
chain of energy production and distribution.  Unbundling would 
better equip the energy industry for dealing with dwindling supply 
and more widespread sources of investment capital (Youngs 2007, 
13).
reciprocal investment rights
The benefits of an unbundled European energy sector are de-
pendent on reciprocity between the European Union and Russia. 
Just as Europe will remain dependent on Russian energy for the 
foreseeable future–these policy proposals are meant to restructure, 
not necessarily eliminate, this dependence–Russia will remain de-
pendent on European demand and on Western capital to finance 
reinvestment in upstream infrastructure ( Jackson 2006, 6). Yet 
Russia cannot expect to benefit from this capital as long as it engag-
es in tactics such as those carried out at Sakhalin and Kovytka gas 
fields, where Royal Dutch Shell and BP, respectively, were forced to 
sell their stakes in developing projects to Gazprom in what could 
be termed benign expropriations (Dellecker 2008, 6; Leonard and 
Popescu 2007, 23). 
Only by taking the “fear tax” out of investments in energy 
production can Russia ensure the same rights for its own invest-
ments downstream in Europe and the United States (Egenhofer 
et al 2006, 4). The United States has a vested interest in this sort 
of reciprocity.  Whereas Lukoil, a Russian oil firm, was allowed to 
purchase one hundred percent of U.S. firm Getty Petroleum and its 
1,500 service stations, American and European firms are restricted 
to an apparent ownership ceiling of twenty percent on their invest-
ments in Russia (Smith 2008, 7).12 This lack of reciprocity is also 
12 Though forty-nine percent is the “official” ceiling for foreign ownership, the reality 
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of direct concern to European consumers of Russian gas; without 
sufficient capital investment in production infrastructure, Russia 
will not be able to sustain current levels of production in coming 
years, creating the possibility of future energy shortages (Baran 
2007, 11). The missing factor is investment, not the availability of 
capital. Foreign investors cannot be expected to pour the enormous 
amounts of capital required for the continued exploitation of Rus-
sian resources without a significant solidification of investor and 
property rights (Monaghan and Montanaro-Jankowski 2006, 20).
 The United States can pursue investment reciprocation 
through forums such as Russian WTO accession talks.  It can 
also push for Russian ratification of a new treaty that would be 
acceptable to all parties replacing the moribund Energy Charter 
Treaty (Emerson  2006, 7). 13 A new treaty which secures investor 
rights and reduces transit risks would be advantageous not only to 
Europe but also to Russia, which would benefit from a clear legal 
mechanism to arbitrate energy disputes with transit states such as 
Ukraine (Bely 2009, 6). The American role in securing passage of 
such a treaty could also involve exerting diplomatic pressure on cer-
tain new EU members, such as Poland and Lithuania, which have 
in the past obstructed further negotiations with Russia (Velyami-
nov 2009).
 focus on liquefied natural gas
Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) currently represents fifteen 
percent of EU gas imports.  Easier to move and store than ordinary 
appears to be twenty percent, based on coercive tactics that have emerged when investors 
attempted to go higher.
13 In 1991, several European countries participated in the creation of an international 
agreement designed to bring together the energy sectors of Western Europe and the former 
Eastern bloc.  The Energy Charter Treaty itself was signed in 1994 and as of today has 
fifty-one signatories, including both EU member states as well as CIS members such as 
Kazakhstan and Ukraine.  The Treaty primarily covers issues of investment, free trade in 
energy goods and services, and dispute settlement.  In the mid-2000s, Russia signed the 
treaty, but never ratified it, citing Articles 5 and 20 as major stumbling blocks.  These articles 
concern opening pipeline capacity to foreign suppliers for transit and sale, respectively – in 
Moscow’s eyes, both unacceptable concessions.
gas, it would be a useful complement to an integrated continental 
distribution grid (Belkin 2008, CRS-18–CRS-19). In an integrat-
ed market, LNG sells much like oil, in the sense that it is highly 
mobile and difficult to manipulate geopolitically (Noël 2008, 6). 
Moreover, producers including Norway, Algeria, Nigeria, and Qa-
tar have begun selling LNG, offering Europe an immediate means 
for reducing dependence on Russian pipelines (Council of the Eu-
ropean Union 2007, 17). Russia also has a vested interest in LNG, 
which would allow it greater export flexibility (Kupchinsky 2007, 
1). The United States can encourage the development of LNG in-
frastructure in Europe, particularly in the pipeline-dependent Bal-
tic states and Poland (European Commission 2008, 9). Whereas 
LNG was constrained by prohibitive costs only a decade ago, a 
recently concluded boom in the construction of liquification and 
de-liquification plant infrastructure has made it “competitive with 
pipeline gas.”  Indeed, the growth rate in LNG production has for 
several years exceeded the growth in overall natural gas production 
capacity (Dahlman Rose & Co. 2009, 6). Through a partnership 
for LNG investment and technology transfer, the United States 
and Europe could further encourage the transformation of the gas 
market into an oil-like market, with spot purchase and arbitrage 
gas availability taking the place of contract-driven pipeline-deliv-
ered gas (Day 2009).
focus on nuclear Energy
In reducing dependence on imported sources of energy, the 
European Commission has chosen to emphasize the role of renew-
able energy sources such as wind and solar power.  However, its 
own analysts admit that “[e]ven when the renewable energy policy 
goals are reached, Europe is likely to be dependent on more imports 
than today” (European Commission  2008, 2). Thus, if Europe is 
to make progress on reducing dependency on imported gas and 
oil, projected to reach sevetny and ninety percent respectively by 
2020, other sources must be considered (European Commission 
2008, 18). Currently, nuclear energy is Europe’s biggest single non-
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imported source of energy (European Commission 2008, 9–10), 
supplying fifteen percent of total EU energy consumption needs 
and thirty-one percent of electricity needs (FORATOM 2007, 1). 
Europe’s nuclear industry enjoys a global leadership, with 148 re-
actors in fifteen of twenty-seven member states easily outproduc-
ing the United States’ own nuclear sector (European Commission 
2008, 1). Yet attitudes towards nuclear energy differ widely; where-
as France satisfies nearly three quarters of its electricity demand 
through nuclear power (Belkin 2008), Germany and Sweden have 
only recently begun reconsidering plans to phase out nuclear pow-
er generation altogether (The Economist Intelligence Unit 2009, 
1–2). The United States, meanwhile, has not built a new reactor 
in decades, and tentative plans for a new generation of American 
nuclear plants are based on a French design (Wald 2008).
 Obviously, the choice of pursuing nuclear power cannot 
be forced onto any EU member state, or the United States for 
that matter (European Commission 2008, 4). However, given the 
fact that simply maintaining nuclear generating capacity in both 
the United States and the European Union will require extensive 
new construction (FORATOM 2007, 2), a transatlantic nuclear 
collaborative effort would make long-term energy independence 
all the more feasible.  This collaborative effort could come under 
the auspices of the IAEA in the form of a new transatlantic agree-
ment for nuclear cooperation, comprising the United States, the 
European Union, and Russia.  Indeed, nuclear energy cooperation 
offers an opportunity to defuse some of the tension that may result 
from overtly acting to reduce dependency on Russian gas.  Current 
nuclear sector collaboration with Russia, such as the Rosatom-Sie-
mens joint nuclear power engineering enterprise in the Kaliningrad 
enclave of Russia or the Department of Energy-Russian Ministry 
of Energy common protocol (U.S. Department of Energy 2003, 2), 
can serve as a model for pooling American, European, and Russian 
efforts towards common goals such as avoiding proliferation and 
ensuring nuclear safety (The Economist Intelligence Unit 2009, 
1–2).
The European Union’s indigenous energy production is de-
pleting partly due to reluctance to maintain or expand generation 
sources perceived to be polluting or unsafe, such as coal and nuclear 
energy (European Commission 2008, 8). By 2020, nuclear power’s 
contribution to European energy production is projected to fall un-
less a significant number of new plants are built to meet new de-
mand and replace obsolete reactors (European Commission 2008, 
15). The United States faces a similar problem, and has a similar 
aversion to increasing carbon or import dependency.  A joint part-
nership could serve as a model for a world whose energy use is pro-
jected to rise 50 percent  by 2030 (Barden 2008, 34). Nuclear power 
has been criticized as “not a credible option” in the short term (Noël 
2008, 2); however, within the framework of a larger transatlantic 
effort, it could be essential to a long-term energy solution.
CASE StUDiES
South Stream
The stalled U.S.- and EU-backed Nabucco pipeline em-
blemizes the disadvantages of the European Union’s current ap-
proach to energy policy.  Intended to carry Caspian and possibly 
Iraqi natural gas westwards through Turkey to a hub terminal in 
Austria, it has been overshadowed by the Russian-backed South 
Stream project.  South Stream, like its Baltic cousin Nord Stream, 
expensively cuts across the sea floor (the Black Sea between Russia 
to Turkey) in order to avoid the costs (in the form of annual tran-
sit fees) and the risks (in the form of the constant risk of contract 
renegotiation) of transit countries such as Ukraine. Owned by a 
consortium comprising both Gazprom and Italian utility ENI, the 
sixty-three bcm pipeline is set to be completed by 2015 (Mankoff 
2009, 20). It is, in the words of Hungarian Prime Minister Gy-
urcsány, “backed by a very strong will and a strong organizational 
power,” contrasting clearly with the institutionally fragmented EU 
(Baran 2007, 140).
To set South Stream in motion, Russia picked out one coun-
try, Hungary, for a lucrative bilateral deal.  By guaranteeing Prime 
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Minister Gyurcsány that South Stream would terminate in Hun-
gary, giving it partial ownership of the terminal storage facility, 
Gazprom—with support from the Kremlin—effectively co-opted 
one EU member at the expense of the entire Union’s energy inde-
pendence (Dempsey 2009). South Stream, like Nord Stream, is an 
overtly political project: it simply diverts gas that currently flows 
through Ukraine.  As part of the deal, Gazprom agreed to construct 
a spur off the pipeline into Serbia, gaining control of Serbian oil 
company NIS in exchange (Pop 2008). Romano Prodi, the former 
Italian Primer Minister, was offered chairmanship of the project, in 
a parallel to former German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder’s cur-
rent chairmanship of the Nord Stream consortium, for which he 
is paid an annual salary of one million euros (Cohen and Szaszdi 
2009, 9; Osipov 2007, 9). 
South Stream, in other words, perfectly demonstrates the 
failings of Europe’s fragmented market.  This situation allows for 
maneuvering by a producer country—Russia—that does not of-
fer consumer countries the same investment rights it regularly ex-
ercises downstream.  The competitor pipeline, Nabucco, is truly a 
“litmus test” of European institutional and political strength.  For 
its own part, the United States did exercise extensive pressure on 
the Hungarian Gyurcsány government to back Nabucco (Baran 
2008). However, in the end the prime minister agreed to the Rus-
sian proposal, after he realized that the EU– and U.S.– backed 
plan appeared to be crippled by political fragmentation (Cohen and 
Szaszdi 2009, 9).
Nabucco, if it were to be built, would break Russia’s monopoly 
on Caspian natural gas.  By 2020, for example, it would allow Azer-
baijan to export an amount of gas equal to one third of Russia’s 
current exports to the European Union (Baran 2007, 24).14 Yet 
even if it existed today, it would not break Russia’s control over the 
European market.  This can only occur when the European Union 
14 This would be an important achievement, even if political considerations are set 
aside.  Currently Russia is using Central Asian and Azerbaijani gas to replace its own 
declining capacity. Forcing competition would be an added incentive for necessary Russian 
production investment.
implements a single energy market, a market immune to lucrative 
but ultimately one-sided deals that hamper European unity.  In an 
integrated grid and market, Nabucco could then be tied into coun-
tries like Poland or even the Baltic states through proposed supple-
mentary pipelines, including north-south links, finally installing a 
gas alternative where none exists today (Baran 2007, 24).15
 
the Caucasus and Caspian Sea regions
The geopolitical importance of the Caucasus and Caspian 
regions, particularly in recent years, is hard to overstate.  The area 
is an energy crossroads, home to pipelines, oil and gas fields, and 
clashing geopolitical ambitions.  As a result of Europe’s energy de-
pendence, its leaders are tempted to cast a blind eye when Russia 
bullies or hampers democratic efforts in nations such as Azerbaijan, 
Georgia, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan because of their energy 
producer or transit country status (Baran 2007, 133). Moreover, 
using its unchallenged energy muscle, Russia has successfully ac-
quired substantial geopolitical influence in the region.  This in turn 
has further weakened Europe’s position by denying it independent 
alternate energy suppliers (Baran 2007, 10).
The United States has previously succeeded in improving 
its Caucasus allies’ energy security.  In the late 1990s, the United 
States assisted the Azerbaijani and Georgian governments in con-
structing independently owned pipelines from Baku to Turkey and 
on to Europe, free of Russian control (Baran 2007, 12–13). With 
cooperation from NATO ally Turkey, the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan 
(BTC) oil pipeline connected Azerbaijan’s Caspian Sea shoreline 
to Turkey’s southern coast in 2006 (Baran 2007, 136). The United 
States also helped prevent Gazprom’s takeover of this and other 
Georgian energy infrastructure by offering Tbilisi a grant to main-
tain and upgrade its network (Baran 2007, 25). The BTC pipeline 
was briefly threatened during Russia’s 2008 invasion of Georgia, 
underlining the geopolitical and symbolic value of this independent 
15 With pipeline connections to coastal de-liquifiation terminals offering access to other 
gas alternatives in the form of LNG.
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link, which nonetheless represents at most six percent (one million 
barrels of oil per day) of Europe’s overall crude oil demand (Cohen 
and Szaszdi 2009, 2). 16  
Clearly, Russia is in a stronger position today than it was in 
the late 1990s. However, by integrating its capacity for political le-
verage, the EU could join the United States in ensuring that energy 
development in alternate producer regions, especially in the con-
tested Caucasus and Central Asia, is cooperative rather than a zero-
sum game (Baran 2007, 16). This could be accomplished through 
information sharing, investment reciprocity, and possibly through 
negotiations about Iran and missile shield proposals for Eastern 
Europe.  Above all, the United States would need to make clear that 
it is not “surrounding” Russia (Smith 2008, 10), but rather insist-
ing on reciprocal investment access to producer regions —an un-
derstandable goal given apprehension about monopolistic control 
from Gazprom (Bely 2009, 4). By giving its unified, “unambiguous 
support” to a U.S.–supported program for establishing both geo-
political stability and energy market competition in this region, the 
EU can avoid losing Azerbaijan and other alternate producer states 
to agile Russian diplomacy (Loskot-Strachota 2009). 
poliCy rECommEnDAtionS  to  ADVAnCE 
U.S.  intErEStS
In light of the cases and policy options presented above, the 
United States has several options for mitigating European institu-
tional discord and energy dependence on Russia.  Some policies, 
such as nuclear and Liquified Naval Gas cooperation or collabo-
ration with NATO partners such as Turkey, can be accomplished 
directly with the collaboration of relevant U.S. departments (State, 
Defense, and Energy) and agencies.  Others, such as European 
energy market integration and utility unbundling, could be better 
encouraged through primarily ministerial-level diplomatic pressure 
on member states and the European Commission in both bilateral 
16 The BTC pipeline’s capacity is one million barrels of oil per day.  A parallel pipeline, the 
Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum (BTE) pipeline, supplies Azerbaijani natural gas to Turkey.  
meetings as well as roundtable meetings ranging from the Transat-
lantic Economic Council (TEC) to G8 and WTO.  Additionally, 
ambassadors in Europe could express the United States’ recogni-
tion and support for European efforts to reduce dependence on im-
ported energy through diplomatic contacts and opinion editorials 
in local newspapers.  Through these forums, the U.S. could leverage 
the increasing willingness it has recently shown to pursue post–
Kyoto climate change negotiation for a greater EU willingness to 
pursue energy strategy cooperation that would offer the European 
Union a plethora of additional intrinsic benefits, including greater 
supply security. 
First, the Obama Administration should encourage Euro-
pean energy market integration. A major aspect of the EU’s energy 
insecurity involves its inability to transmit energy across national 
borders.  Both Europe and the United States are presently engaged 
in planning for the development of a new generation of energy in-
frastructure. From European objectives such as “overnight battery 
recharging for plug-in electric vehicles” (European Commission 
2008, 1) to American plans for dynamic transcontinental transmis-
sion lines ( Joyce 2009), these plans are comparable and could be 
better coordinated. Currently, only about ten percent of European 
power generation capacity can be exported across borders (Belkin 
2008); similarly, the Obama Administration believes that the cur-
rent American power grid is not equipped to carry new sources of 
energy to points of need (Obama for America 2008, 8).
Implementation of a European energy grid could begin with a 
“warning system” of bilateral deals between European energy firms 
and foreign energy suppliers (Leonard and Popescu 2007, 59). No-
tified in advance of such deals, the Commission would have time 
to review and react to tactical moves by Gazprom.  In the medium 
term, the European Union could continue implementing basic 
transmission and pipeline developments, such as the France–Spain 
and Poland–Lithuania electricity grid interconnections it currently 
coordinates (European Commission 2008, 5–6). In the long term, 
both gas and electricity could begin to be traded across an inte-
grated grid, lessening the need for divisive national-level deals with 
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external suppliers (European Commission 2008, 10). The current 
project for integrating the European grid, Trans-European Energy 
Networks (the aforementioned TEN-E), does not appear to be 
getting the job done (European Commission 2008, 3). Thus, the 
best option for the United States may be to lobby major EU states, 
such as France and Germany, to explore successful existing mod-
els of grid cooperation.  Existing initiatives, such as Baltrel, which 
combines energy producers and transit operators in Scandinavia, 
the Baltics, and Poland, could serve as an “intermediate step to” a 
larger European single market for both gas and electricity (Baltrel 
2007, 3–5).
The U.S. role in this European project is twofold: coordinat-
ing it with its own push for a new generation of transmission infra-
structure, and insisting that a real structure to counteract Russian 
leverage, rather than vague “crisis response mechanisms,” are put in 
place (Council of the European Union 2007, 18). In other words, 
the United States could push for a long-term solution to the issue 
of dependence rather than short-term responses to Russian action. 
If both the European Union and the United States work together, 
both private and public resources will be easier to find, and major 
efforts—such as connecting wind farms in the North Sea and solar 
installations in New Mexico to mainland grids—will be comple-
mentary and coordinated (European Commission 2008, 2–3). Fi-
nally, in contacts with Russia, the United States could make clear 
that an integrated European grid would better equip Russia to ex-
port energy alternatives beyond oil and gas, such as selling electric-
ity directly to an integrated European grid (European Commission 
Green Paper 2006, 6).
Second, the Obama Administration should pursue transat-
lantic energy market liberalization. Liberalization of the transat-
lantic energy market would involve unbundling European monop-
olies, but would provide for the transparency and reciprocity that is 
necessary for constructing a single energy market and two-way flow 
of investment.  This policy would benefit Europe by forestalling 
bilateral deals between Gazprom and national energy firms, and 
it would thus help remove the hidden cost paid by European con-
sumers for the disunity of their energy market.  The United States 
would benefit by finally obtaining the reciprocal right to invest in 
EU utilities as European firms have done in the deregulated U.S. 
energy market for years.  Even Russia would profit from accession 
to this policy, which would give its unbundled firms full investment 
rights downstream and allow Western capital and technology to 
flow to fill critically needed upstream needs without fear of extor-
tion.
The European Union has the power to implement this pro-
posal under its power to enforce competition regulation (Gray 
2009, 1). It will, however, be difficult to put into motion due to the 
resistance of powerful members such as Germany and France, both 
of which have resisted unbundling (Belkin 2008, CRS-9). How-
ever, the only way for an integrated European energy market to be 
fully effective is through the complementary effect of this policy. 
With the strength of a united, liberalized market, Europe could fi-
nally effectively pursue antitrust measures against Gazprom’s viola-
tions (Smith 2008, 2)17 of Article 82 of the European Community 
Treaty (Delegation of the European Union to Ukraine, Moldova, 
and Belarus 2009, 17–18; Baran 2007, 141). 18 Furthermore, 
armed with the strength gained from this policy, the European 
Union would have more leverage in pursuing the expansion of the 
energy acquis to nations such as Ukraine, where a lack of unbun-
dling and transparency has contributed to and exacerbated recent 
gas crises.
The United States has tools and resources to help a Europe 
that has integrated and liberalized its energy sector.  In particular, 
the United States can play a role in prodding investigation of non-
transparent entities such as the notorious RosUkrEnergo, a Swit-
zerland-based firm that has allegedly served as a high-level money-
laundering scheme for well-connected Gazprom and Ukrainian 
17 It certainly is guiltier, and more of a threat to European commercial security, than 
Microsoft has repeatedly been found to be.
18 Article 82 forbids the “abuses of dominant positions” such as “dissimilar conditions for 
equivalent transactions”—an excellent description of Gazprom’s current strategy of price 
discrimination between national European customers.
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officials (Leonard and Popescu 2007, 10–11; Wilson 2009, 1). 
The United States can also assist the effort to liberalize the energy 
market by incentivizing transparency in transit states, by contrib-
uting to funds that help transit states improve infrastructure and 
discouraging geopolitical manipulation, and by cooperating with 
the European Union on intelligence and law enforcement (Smith 
2008, 10).
Third, the Obama Administration should establish a trans-
atlantic partnership for nuclear and LNG collaboration. A new 
collaborative effort on nuclear energy and liquefied natural gas be-
tween the United States, the European Union, and possibly Rus-
sia, would help fill a “glaring omission” in many EU reports about 
energy dependence (European Policy Centre 2007, 2). Starting 
with regular consultations through the existing Strategic Energy 
Dialogue and culminating in a European Aeronautic Defense and 
Space Company (EADS)–style19  multinational partnership for 
the transatlantic community (perhaps under the auspices of the 
IAEA), this proposal would utilize technology to add stability for 
energy consumers and producers alike.
In the field of nuclear energy, this partnership would build off 
existing research collaboration such as Europe’s Energy Research 
Alliance, offering the United States, European Union, and Russia a 
chance to cooperate on improving safety and efficiency in a method 
of power generation all three powers utilize (European Commis-
sion 2008, 8). By standardizing and streamlining regulation, this 
policy would make it easier for French firms to import plans for so-
called “Generation III” nuclear plants, or those incorporating latest 
safety and efficiency features, to the United States—where nuclear 
currently suffers from a regulatory process which is a “a product of 
the 1970s anti-nuclear and post-Three Mile Island mindset” (Spen-
cer 2009, 2; FORATOM, 8). Similarly, U.S. firms would find it 
easier to enter the European market, helping to expand an energy 
19 EADS, or the European Aeronautic Defense and Space Company, most famous for its 
Airbus jets, was founded in 2000 in a merger of several European aerospace firms.  It has 
proven highly successful in terms of encouraging EU industrial and technology integration 
and cooperation in a way that might serve as a useful model for encouraging transatlantic 
energy collaboration.
sector that produces energy “on a large scale, in a secure manner, at 
competitive costs and with respect for the environment” (European 
Commission  2008, 5).20 Existing U.S. legislative efforts at moder-
ating the relatively high startup cost of new nuclear plants, such as a 
provision in the 2005 energy bill to lower the cost of capital for new 
reactors (primarily through debt insurance), could be extended in 
light of recent recommendations that underline the extent to which 
scaled-up reintroduction of nuclear power generation could signifi-
cantly reduce costs (Friedman 2007, 9).
In the field of liquefied natural gas, this proposal would help 
lessen European dependence on the long-term bilateral contracts 
that contribute to disunity among EU members.  By increasingly 
transforming natural gas into an oil–like liquid market with wide-
spread spot (rather than contract) availability, LNG would defuse 
the geopolitical aspect of gas importation (Delyagin 2006, 136-
137). Already, expanded LNG capacity has helped move natural 
gas towards a price structure more like that of oil, a truly global 
commodity (Krauss 2009). The United States and European 
Union could join together in further promoting LNG through tax 
incentives and common regulatory streamlining.  Extensive devel-
opment of LNG would remove the need for highly expensive new 
pipelines, such as South Stream, by making gas available wherever 
a port exists to receive it (Belkin 2008, CRS-15). 
ConClUSion
The European Union is dependent on a small number of large 
suppliers for its energy.  This dependency has severely exacerbated 
the fragmentation of its energy market along national lines and in-
tensified contention between old and new members.  This situation 
endangers both cooperation among EU member states as well as 
the reliability and independence of European diplomatic and po-
20 Eurobarometer polls show that a plurality of opponents to nuclear energy base their 
opposition on dissatisfaction with current waste disposal practices.  A possible solution is 
the approach currently taken by the United Kingdom, which restricts nuclear operators to 
land around decommissioned nuclear plants. 
99Journal of Politics & Society98 Stetsenko  •  transatlantic Energy Security
litical action with regards to United States interests.  By diplomati-
cally prodding the European Union to adopt both a more competi-
tive private energy market and more robust regulation of its energy 
sector, the United States can help dampen the benefits enjoyed by 
suppliers such as Russia as a result of its monopoly power.  By agi-
tating for transmission infrastructure improvement, expansion of 
nuclear power generating capacity, and speeding up of LNG tech-
nology implementation, the United States can help lessen Europe’s 
overall dependence while increasing the economies of scale for its 
own comparable energy reforms (Cohen and Szaszdi 2009, 2).
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